



# Autocrypt Level 1 Specification

*Release 1.1.0*

**Autocrypt team, licensed CC0**

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Autocrypt aims to incrementally and carefully replace cleartext e-mail with end-to-end encrypted e-mail. This differs from the traditional approach of maximizing the security of individual mail communications. **Sometimes Autocrypt recommends to send cleartext mail even though encryption appears technically possible.** This is because we want to avoid unreadable mail for users. Users may mix both Autocrypt-capable and traditional mail apps and they may lose devices or in other ways the ability to decrypt in unrecoverable ways. Reverting to cleartext when we suspect such situations is a key part of our aim to stay out of the way of users.

Another major difference in approach is that Autocrypt Level 1 only defends against passive data collection attacks. We share and support **the new perspective stated in RFC7435 (“Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time”)**<sup>1</sup>. Protection against active adversaries (those which modify messages in transit) is the aim of future specifications.

**Level 1 makes it easy for users to encrypt, based on an automatic and decentralized key distribution mechanism. There are no dependencies on key servers and it is meant to work with existing e-mail providers.** Level 1 focuses on the use of Autocrypt on a single device. Users get rudimentary support on using Autocrypt on more than one device or mail app. This is internally realized through sending and receiving an Autocrypt Setup Message, secured by manually entering a long number. Improving usability for maintaining synchronized Autocrypt state on multiple devices is the aim of future specification efforts.

**Last but not least, Level 1 is meant to be relatively easy for developers to adopt.** It describes the basic capabilities required for a mail app to be Autocrypt-capable at Level 1, allowing it to exchange end-to-end encrypted e-mails with other Autocrypt-capable mail apps. The spec contains detailed guidance on protocol, internal state and user interface concerns. We have a good track record of supporting new implementers. Please don't hesitate to **contact the group**<sup>2</sup> or bring up issues or pull requests. Autocrypt is a living specification and we envision both bugfix and backward-compatible feature releases.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7435.html#section-1.2>

<sup>2</sup> <https://autocrypt.org/en/latest/contact.html>

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# 1 Terminology

## 1.1 Keywords to indicate requirement levels

The keywords “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in the IETF’s Best Current Practice 14 (as defined in [RFC 2119](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119)<sup>3</sup> and [RFC 8174](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8174)<sup>4</sup>) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## 2 Overview

### 2.1 Approach and High Level Overview

Autocrypt’s primary goal is to automate both secret and public key management so that users can encrypt mail without specialized knowledge.

This specification adds an *Autocrypt-specific mail header* (page 5) to outgoing mails, which contains, among other information, the sender’s public key. Transferring public keys in-band means that key discovery in Autocrypt does not require external infrastructure like OpenPGP key servers or x509 PKI.

Autocrypt provides a *set of rules* (page 7) that tracks this information for each communication peer. Autocrypt uses this information to determine whether encryption is possible and makes a *recommendation* (page 7) about whether encryption should be enabled for a given set of recipients.

This specification also introduces the *Autocrypt Setup Message* (page 12) as a way to transfer secret key material and related settings to other e-mail programs controlled by the same user. This spec also provides guidance on how and when to *generate* (page 13), *look for* (page 15), and *import* (page 14) these messages.

Autocrypt aggressively distributes public keys, but conservatively recommends encryption to avoid disruption to established e-mail workflows. Specifically, Autocrypt only recommends that an e-mail be encrypted if encryption is possible, and:

- 1) The sender specifically requests encryption during message composition;
- 2) The e-mail is in reply to an encrypted message; or,
- 3) The sender and the recipients have explicitly stated that they *prefer* (page 5) encrypted e-mail.

### 2.2 Requirements on MUA/E-mail Provider interactions

Autocrypt tries to impose minimal requirements on MUA and e-mail service interactions. Specifically, an Autocrypt-capable MUA needs to be able to:

- Control the contents of outgoing e-mail including the ability to set custom e-mail headers;
- Send e-mail on its own (required by the *Autocrypt Setup Message* (page 12));
- Read whole, raw e-mails including message headers; and,
- Optionally, scan the user’s mailbox for mail with specific headers.

If a particular e-mail account does not expose one of the required features (e.g., if it only exposes a javascript-driven web interface for message composition that does not allow setting e-mail headers), then the e-mail account cannot be used with Autocrypt. An Autocrypt-capable MUA may still access and control the account, but it will not be able to enable Autocrypt on it.

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<sup>3</sup> [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119.html](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119)

<sup>4</sup> [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8174.html](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8174)

## 2.3 Autocrypt Internal State

An Autocrypt MUA needs to associate information with the peers it communicates with and the accounts it controls.

### 2.3.1 Communication Peers

Each communication peer is identified by an e-mail address. Autocrypt associates state with each peer. Conceptually, we represent this state as a table named `peers`, which is indexed by the peer's *canonicalized e-mail address* (page 16), .

For the peer with the address `addr`, an MUA MUST associate the following attributes with `peers[addr]`:

- `last_seen`: The UTC timestamp of the most recent effective date (*definition* (page 7)) of all messages that the MUA has processed from this peer.
- `autocrypt_timestamp`: The UTC timestamp of the most recent effective date (the “youngest”) of all messages containing a valid Autocrypt header that the MUA has processed from this peer.
- `public_key`: The value of the `keydata` attribute derived from the youngest Autocrypt header that has ever been seen from the peer.
- `prefer_encrypt`: The `prefer-encrypt` value (either `nopreference` or `mutual`) derived from the youngest Autocrypt header ever seen from the peer.

Autocrypt-capable MUAs that implement *Gossip* (page 10) should also associate the following additional attributes with `peers[addr]`:

- `gossip_timestamp`: the UTC timestamp of the most recent effective date of all messages containing a valid Autocrypt-Gossip header about the peer.
- `gossip_key`: the value of the `keydata` attribute derived from the most recent message containing a valid Autocrypt-Gossip header about the peer.

How this information is managed and used is discussed in *Peer State Management* (page 5).

### 2.3.2 Accounts controlled by the MUA

A Level 1 MUA maintains an internal structure `accounts` indexed by the account's *canonicalized e-mail address* (page 16) (`addr`). For each account controlled by the MUA, `accounts[addr]` has the following attributes:

- `enabled`: a boolean value, indicating whether Autocrypt is enabled for this account.
- `secret_key`: The secret key material used for the account (see *Secret key generation and storage* (page 11)).
- `public_key`: The OpenPGP transferable public key (**OpenPGP “Transferable Public Key”**<sup>5</sup>) derived from the secret key.
- `prefer_encrypt`: The user's encryption preference for this account. This is either `mutual` or `nopreference`. This SHOULD default to `nopreference`.

If `accounts[addr].enabled` is `true`, the MUA SHOULD allow the user to switch the setting for `accounts[addr].prefer_encrypt`. This choice might be hidden in something like a “preferences pane”. See *Account Preferences* (page 15) for a specific example of how this could look.

How this information is managed and used is discussed in *Managing accounts controlled by the MUA* (page 11).

<sup>5</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.1>

## 3 Peer State Management

An Autocrypt MUA updates the state it holds for each communication peer using the e-mails received from that peer. Specifically, Autocrypt updates the state using the `Autocrypt` e-mail header.

### 3.1 The Autocrypt Header

The `Autocrypt` header has the following format:

```
Autocrypt: addr=a@b.example.org; [prefer-encrypt=mutual;] keydata=BASE64
```

There are three defined attributes:

- The `addr` attribute is mandatory, and contains the single recipient address this header is valid for. If this address differs from the one in the `From` header, the entire `Autocrypt` header **MUST** be treated as invalid.  
**The Internet Message Format**<sup>6</sup> documents three types of originator fields: `From`, `Sender`, and `Reply-To`. Autocrypt is concerned only with the `From` field, and ignores the other originator fields.
- The `prefer-encrypt` attribute is optional and can only occur with the value `mutual`. Its presence in the `Autocrypt` header indicates an agreement to enable encryption by default with other peers who have the same preference. An Autocrypt Level 1 MUA that sees the attribute with any other value (or that does not see the attribute at all) should interpret the value as `nopreference`.
- The `keydata` attribute is mandatory, and contains the key data for the specified `addr` recipient address. The value of the `keydata` attribute is a Base64 representation of the binary **OpenPGP “Transferable Public Key”**<sup>7</sup>. For ease of parsing, the `keydata` attribute **MUST** be the last attribute in this header.

Additional attributes are possible before the `keydata` attribute. If an attribute name starts with an underscore (`_`), it is a “non-critical” attribute. An attribute name without a leading underscore is a “critical” attribute. The MUA **SHOULD** ignore any unsupported non-critical attributes and continue parsing the rest of the header as though the attribute does not exist. It **MUST** treat the entire `Autocrypt` header as invalid if it encounters a “critical” attribute that it doesn’t support.

To introduce incompatible changes, future versions of Autocrypt may send multiple Autocrypt headers, and hide the incompatible headers from Level 1 MUAs by using critical attributes. According to the above rules, such headers will be judged invalid, and discarded by level 1 MUAs. Such an update to the specification will also have to describe how an updated MUA will deal with multiple valid headers.

#### 3.1.1 OpenPGP Based key data

The `keydata` sent by an Autocrypt-enabled Level 1 MUA **MUST** consist of an **OpenPGP “Transferable Public Key”**<sup>8</sup> containing exactly these five OpenPGP packets:

- a signing-capable primary key
- a user id
- a self signature over the user id by the primary key
- an encryption-capable subkey
- a binding signature over the subkey by the primary key

The content of the user id packet is only decorative. By convention, it contains the same address used in the `addr` attribute placed in angle brackets. (This makes it conform to the **RFC 5322**<sup>9</sup> grammar `angle-addr`.) For compatibility concerns, the user id **SHOULD NOT** be an empty string.

These packets **MUST** be assembled in binary format (not ASCII-armored), and then base64-encoded.

<sup>6</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5322.html#section-3.6.2>

<sup>7</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.1>

<sup>8</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.1>

<sup>9</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5322.html>

A Level 1 MUA MUST be capable of processing and handling Ed25519 public keys for signatures, as well as Cv25519 for encryption. It MAY support other OpenPGP key formats found in an Autocrypt header (for example, by passing it agnostically to an OpenPGP backend for handling). In particular, it SHOULD support the RSA algorithm for both signatures and encryption.

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**Note:** To optimize for compatibility, earlier versions of this document REQUIRED support for RSA, and recommended a 3072 bit RSA key configuration. Support for elliptic curve cryptography in deployed OpenPGP implementations improved since then, and the switch to ECC was made in version 1.1 (January 2019) due to message size considerations.

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### 3.1.2 Header injection in outbound mail

During message composition, if the `From:` header of the outgoing e-mail (the `from-addr`) matches an address for which `accounts[from-addr].enabled` is `true` and the Autocrypt-capable MUA has secret key material (`accounts[from-addr].secret_key`), the MUA SHOULD include an Autocrypt header.

This header MUST contain the corresponding public key material (`accounts[from-addr].public_key`) as the `keydata` attribute, and `from-addr` as the `addr` attribute. The most minimal Level 1 compliant MUA will only include these two attributes. If `accounts[from-addr].prefer_encrypt` is set to `mutual`, then the header MUST have a `prefer-encrypt` attribute with the value `mutual`.

The MUA MUST NOT include more than one valid Level 1 Autocrypt header (see *Updating Autocrypt Peer State* (page 7)).

If the `From` address changes during message composition (e.g., if the user selects a different outbound identity), then the MUA MUST change the Autocrypt header accordingly.

An MUA SHOULD send out the same `Autocrypt:` header in all messages from a given outbound identity. An MUA SHOULD NOT vary the header based on the message's recipients. If (for whatever reason) the MUA needs to update (or discovers an update of) the user's `keydata` at some point, the MUA SHOULD send the updated `keydata` in all subsequent Autocrypt headers.

See *Example Autocrypt headers* (page 17) for examples of outbound headers and the following sections for header format definitions and parsing.

## 3.2 Internal state storage

See *Communication Peers* (page 4) for the information stored for each communication peer.

Autocrypt MUAs keep state about each peer, to handle several nuanced situations that have caused trouble or annoyance in the past. This state is updated even when the peer sends mail without an Autocrypt header.

For example, if a remote peer disables Autocrypt or drops back to only using a non-Autocrypt MUA, we must stop sending encrypted mails to this peer automatically.

In addition to the per-peer state described in *Communication Peers* (page 4), MUAs MAY also store other information gathered for heuristic purposes, or for other cryptographic schemes (see [the Autocrypt website](#)<sup>10</sup> for some example ideas).

However, in order to support future synchronization of Autocrypt state between MUAs, it is critical that Autocrypt-capable MUAs maintain the state specified here, regardless of what additional state they track.

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**Note:**

- An implementation MAY also choose to use keys from other sources (e.g., a local keyring) at its own discretion.

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<sup>10</sup> <https://autocrypt.org/en/latest/optional-state.html>

- If an implementation chooses to automatically ingest a key from an `application/pgp-keys` attachment as though it was found in an `Autocrypt` header, it should only do so if the attached key has a **User ID**<sup>11</sup> that matches the message's `From` address.
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### 3.3 Updating Autocrypt Peer State

Incoming messages may be processed to update the `peers` entry for the sender identified by `from-addr` as extracted from the `From` header, by an MUA at receive or display time.

Messages SHOULD be ignored (i.e., `peers[from-addr]` SHOULD NOT be updated) in the following cases:

- The content-type is `multipart/report`. In this case, it can be assumed the message was auto-generated. This avoids triggering a `reset` state from received Message Disposition Notifications (RFC 3798<sup>12</sup>).
- There is more than one address in the `From` header.
- The MUA believes the message to be spam. If the user marks the message as not being spam the message MAY then be processed for `Autocrypt` headers.

When parsing an incoming message, an MUA SHOULD examine all `Autocrypt` headers, rather than just the first one. If there is more than one valid header, this SHOULD be treated as an error, and all `Autocrypt` headers discarded as invalid.

Updating `peers[from-addr]` depends on:

- the `effective date` of the message, which we define as the sending time of the message as indicated by its `Date` header, or the time of receipt if that date is in the future or unavailable.

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**Note:** A message without a `Date` header, or with a `Date` that seems to be in the far future can cause problems for MUAs that encounter the message repeatedly (e.g. re-delivery, subsequent scans, etc). An MUA MAY decide to ignore such a message entirely for the purposes of `Autocrypt` processing. If an MUA is capable of associating information with a received message, it could instead save the `effective date` of such a message the first time it sees it to avoid accidental re-processing.

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- the `keydata` and `prefer-encrypt` attributes of the single valid `Autocrypt` header (see above), if available.

The update process proceeds as follows:

1. If the message's effective date is older than the `peers[from-addr].autocrypt_timestamp` value, then no changes are required, and the update process terminates.
2. If the message's effective date is more recent than `peers[from-addr].last_seen` then set `peers[from-addr].last_seen` to the message's effective date.
3. If the `Autocrypt` header is unavailable, no further changes are required and the update process terminates.
4. Set `peers[from-addr].autocrypt_timestamp` to the message's effective date.
5. Set `peers[from-addr].public_key` to the corresponding `keydata` value of the `Autocrypt` header.
6. Set `peers[from-addr].prefer_encrypt` to the corresponding `prefer-encrypt` value of the `Autocrypt` header.

### 3.4 Provide a recommendation for message encryption

On message composition, an `Autocrypt`-capable MUA can decide whether to try to encrypt the new e-mail message. `Autocrypt` provides a recommendation for the MUA.

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<sup>11</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-5.11>

<sup>12</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3798.html>

All Autocrypt-capable MUAs should be able to calculate the same Autocrypt recommendation.

This recommendation algorithm provides sensible guidance that avoids many common problems, and Autocrypt-capable MUAs SHOULD follow the recommendation. An implementation that deviates from the recommendation should do so on the basis of specific external evidence or knowledge, while carefully considering the impact of any variation, including:

- does it increase the chance of producing unexpectedly unreadable mail (for either the sender or the recipient)?
- does it leak previously encrypted content in the clear?
- does it force the user to confront a choice they do not have the information or knowledge to make safely?

If an implementation deviates from the Autocrypt recommendation in a meaningful and useful way, the implementer should describe the variation publicly so it can be considered for future revisions of this specification.

### 3.4.1 Recommendation structure

The Autocrypt recommendation depends on the recipient addresses of the draft message, and on whether or not the message is a reply to an encrypted message. When the user changes the recipients during composition, the Autocrypt recommendation may change.

The output of the Autocrypt recommendation algorithm has two elements:

- `ui-recommendation`: a single state recommending the state of the encryption user interface, described below.
- `target-keys`: a map of recipient addresses to public keys.

`ui-recommendation` can take four possible values:

- `disable`: Disable or hide any UI that would allow the user to choose to encrypt the message. This happens iff encryption is not immediately possible.
- `discourage`: Enable UI that would allow the user to choose to encrypt the message, but do not default to encryption. If the user manually enables encryption, the MUA SHOULD warn that the recipient may not be able to read the message. This warning message MAY be supplemented using [optional counters and user-agent state](#)<sup>13</sup>.
- `available`: Enable UI that would allow the user to choose to encrypt the message, but do not default to encryption.
- `encrypt`: Enable UI that would allow the user to choose to send the message in cleartext, and default to encryption.

### 3.4.2 Recommendations for single-recipient messages

The Autocrypt recommendation for a message composed to a single recipient with the e-mail address `to-addr` depends primarily on the value stored in `peers[to-addr]` (page 4).

#### Determine if encryption is possible

If there is no `peers[to-addr]`, then set `ui-recommendation` to `disable`, and terminate.

For the purposes of the rest of this recommendation, if either `public_key` or `gossip_key` is revoked, expired, or otherwise known to be unusable for encryption, then treat that key as though it were `null` (not present).

If both `public_key` and `gossip_key` are `null`, then set `ui-recommendation` to `disable` and terminate.

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<sup>13</sup> <https://autocrypt.org/en/latest/optional-state.html>



Otherwise, we derive the recommendation using a two-phase algorithm. The first phase computes the preliminary-recommendation.

### Preliminary Recommendation

If `public_key` is null, then set `target-keys[to-addr]` to `gossip_key` and set preliminary-recommendation to discourage and skip to the *Deciding to Encrypt by Default* (page 9).

Otherwise, set `target-keys[to-addr]` to `public_key`.

If `autocrypt_timestamp` is more than 35 days older than `last_seen`, set preliminary-recommendation to discourage.

Otherwise, set preliminary-recommendation to available.

### Deciding to Encrypt by Default

The final phase turns on encryption by setting `ui-recommendation` to encrypt in two scenarios:

- If preliminary-recommendation is either available or discourage, and the message is composed as a reply to an encrypted message, or
- If the preliminary-recommendation is available and both `peers[to-addr].prefer_encrypt` and `accounts[from-addr].prefer_encrypt` are mutual.

Otherwise, the `ui-recommendation` is set to preliminary-recommendation.

### 3.4.3 Recommendations for messages to multiple addresses

For level 1 MUAs, the Autocrypt recommendation for a message composed to multiple recipients, we derive the message's recommendation from the recommendations for each recipient individually.

The aggregate `target-keys` for the message is the merge of all recipient `target-keys`.

The aggregate `ui-recommendation` for the message is derived in the following way (the earliest matching rule encountered below takes precedence over later rules):

1. If any recipient has a `ui-recommendation` of `disable`, then the message's `ui-recommendation` is `disable`.
2. If every recipient has a `ui-recommendation` of `encrypt`, then the message `ui-recommendation` is `encrypt`.
3. If any recipient has a `ui-recommendation` of `discourage`, then the message `ui-recommendation` is `discourage`.

Otherwise, the message `ui-recommendation` is available.

While composing a message, a situation might occur where the `ui-recommendation` is available, the user has explicitly enabled encryption, and then modifies the list of recipients in a way that changes the `ui-recommendation` to `disable`. When this happens, the MUA should not disable encryption without communicating this to the user. A graceful way to handle this situation is to save the enabled state, and only prompt the user about the issue when they send the mail.

## 3.5 Message Encryption

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**Note:** An e-mail that is said to be “encrypted” here will be both signed and encrypted in the cryptographic sense.

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An outgoing e-mail message will be sent encrypted in either of two cases:

- the Autocrypt recommendation for the list of recipients is `encrypt`, and not explicitly overridden by the user, or
- the Autocrypt recommendation is `available` or `discourage`, and the user chose to encrypt.

When encrypting, the MUA MUST construct the encrypted message as a **PGP/MIME**<sup>14</sup> message that is signed by the user’s Autocrypt key, and encrypted to the currently known Autocrypt key of each recipient, as well as the sender’s Autocrypt key.

### 3.5.1 E-mail Drafts

For messages that are going to be encrypted when sent, the MUA MUST take care to not leak the cleartext of drafts or other partially composed messages to their e-mail provider (e.g., in the “Drafts” folder). If there is a chance that a message could be encrypted, the MUA SHOULD encrypt the draft only to itself before storing it remotely. The MUA SHOULD NOT sign drafts.

### 3.5.2 Cleartext replies to encrypted messages

In the common case, a reply to an encrypted message will also be encrypted. Due to Autocrypt’s opportunistic approach to key discovery, however, it is possible that keys for some of the recipients may not be available, and, as such, a reply can only be sent in the clear.

To avoid leaking cleartext from the original encrypted message in this case, the MUA MAY prepare the cleartext reply without including any of the typically quoted and attributed text from the previous message. Additionally, the MUA MAY include some text in the message body describing why the usual quoted text is missing. An example of such copy can be found in *Example Copy when a Reply can’t be Encrypted* (page 19).

The above recommendations are only “MAY” and not “SHOULD” or “MUST” because we want to accommodate a user-friendly Level 1 MUA that stays silent and does not impede the user’s ability to reply. Opportunistic encryption means we can’t guarantee encryption in every case.

## 3.6 Key Gossip

It is a common use case to send an encrypted mail to a group of recipients. To ensure that these recipients can encrypt messages when replying to that same group, the keys of all recipients can be included in the encrypted payload. This does not include BCC recipients, which by definition must not be revealed to other recipients.

The `Autocrypt-Gossip` header has the same format as the `Autocrypt` header (see *autocryptheaderformat* (page 6)). Its `addr` attribute indicates the recipient address this header is valid for as usual, but may relate to any recipient in the `To` or `Cc` header. See example in *Example Autocrypt Gossip headers* (page 17)

The `Autocrypt-Gossip` header MAY also be used to include keys for the address specified in the `Reply-To` header. This allows replying encrypted even if the address differs from those in the `From`, `To`, and `Cc` headers.

### 3.6.1 Key Gossip Injection in Outbound Messages

An Autocrypt MUA MAY include `Autocrypt-Gossip` headers in messages. These headers MUST be placed in the root MIME part of the encrypted message payload. The encrypted payload in this case contains one `Autocrypt-Gossip` header for each address. Each header:

- MUST include an `addr` attribute that matches one of the addresses in the `To`, `Cc`, or `Reply-To` headers.
- MUST include the `keydata` attribute. For `To` and `Cc` headers it MUST contain the same public key which is used to encrypt the mail to the recipient referenced by `addr`. See also *Preliminary Recommendation* (page 9) for how this key is selected. For the address in the `Reply-To` headers it SHOULD contain the public key which the sender expects to be used for that address.
- SHOULD NOT include a `prefer-encrypt` attribute.

<sup>14</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3156.html>

If a key has multiple user ids, only one SHOULD be contained in `keydata`. This user id SHOULD be picked to match the `addr` attribute, if possible. This is only relevant for keys which came from or were merged with data from external sources.

To avoid leaking metadata about a third party in the clear, an `Autocrypt-Gossip` header SHOULD NOT be added outside an encrypted MIME part.

### 3.6.2 Updating Autocrypt Peer State from Key Gossip

An incoming message may contain one or more `Autocrypt-Gossip` headers in the encrypted payload. Each of these headers may update the Autocrypt peer state of the gossiped address identified by its `addr` value (referred to here as `gossip-addr`) in the following way:

1. If `gossip-addr` does not match any address in the mail's `To`, `Cc`, or `Reply-To` header, the update process terminates (i.e., header is ignored).
2. If `peers[gossip-addr].gossip_timestamp` is more recent than the message's effective date, then the update process terminates.
3. Set `peers[gossip-addr].gossip_timestamp` to the message's effective date.
4. Set `peers[gossip-addr].gossip_key` to the value of the `keydata` attribute.

## 4 Managing accounts controlled by the MUA

See *Accounts controlled by the MUA* (page 4) for a definition of the structure of information stored about the MUA's own e-mail accounts.

### 4.1 Secret key generation and storage

The MUA SHOULD generate and store a Ed25519 plus Cv25519 secret key for the user, the former for signing and self-certification, the latter for decrypting. The MUA MUST be capable of assembling these keys into an OpenPGP certificate (RFC 4880 “Transferable Public Key”<sup>15</sup>) that indicates these capabilities.

#### 4.1.1 Secret key protection at rest

The secret key material should be protected from access by other applications or co-tenants of the device at least as well as the passwords the MUA retains for the user's IMAP or SMTP accounts.

The MUA MAY protect the secret key (and other sensitive data it has access to) with a password, but it SHOULD NOT require the user to enter the password each time they send or receive a mail. Since Autocrypt-enabled MUAs *sign all encrypted outgoing messages* (page 9), it could happen that the user has to enter the password very often, both for reading and sending mail. This introduces too much friction to become part of a routine daily workflow.

Note that password protection of the secret key carries with it a risk that the user might forget their password, which might result in catastrophic data loss. Unlike IMAP or SMTP credentials (which can be reset by the server operator given some sort of out-of-band confirmation), there is no recovery workflow possible for the loss of a password protecting a secret key. An MUA that chooses to offer password protection of the secret key (or other sensitive data) SHOULD support usable and secure backup/recovery workflows for the protected material.

Protection of the user's keys (and other sensitive data) at rest is achieved more easily and securely with filesystem-based encryption and other forms of access control.

<sup>15</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.1>

## 4.2 Handling Multiple Accounts and Aliases

An MUA that is capable of connecting to multiple e-mail accounts **SHOULD** have a separate and distinct Autocrypt `accounts[from-addr]` for each e-mail account with the address `from-addr`.

A multi-account MUA **MAY** maintain a single `peers` table that merges information from e-mail received across all accounts for the sake of implementation simplicity. While this results in some linkability between accounts (the effect of mails sent to one account can be observed by activity on the other account), it provides a more uniform and predictable user experience. Any linkability concerns introduced by Autocrypt can be mitigated by using a different MUA for each e-mail account.

Sometimes a user may be able to send and receive e-mails with multiple distinct e-mail addresses (“aliases”) via a single account. For the purposes of Autocrypt, the MUA **SHOULD** treat each specific alias as a distinct account.

## 4.3 Avoiding MUA Conflicts

If more than one Autocrypt-enabled MUA generates a key and then distributes it to communication peers, encrypted mail sent to the user is only readable by the MUA that sent the last message. This can lead to behavior that is unpredictable and confusing for the user.

See section *Helping Users get Started* (page 15) for guidance on how to detect and avoid such a situation.

## 4.4 Autocrypt Setup Message

To avoid “lock-in” of secret key material on a particular MUA, Autocrypt level 1 includes a way to “export” the user’s keys and her *prefer-encrypt state* (page 4) for other MUAs to pick up, asynchronously and with explicitly required user interaction.

The mechanism available is a specially-formatted e-mail message called the Autocrypt Setup Message. An already-configured Autocrypt MUA can generate an Autocrypt Setup Message, and send it to itself. A not-yet-configured Autocrypt MUA (a new MUA in a multi-device case, or recovering from device failure or loss) can import the Autocrypt Setup Message and recover the ability to read existing messages.

An Autocrypt Setup Message is protected with a *Setup Code* (page 13).

### 4.4.1 Message Structure

The Autocrypt Setup Message itself is an e-mail message with a specific format. While the message structure is complex, it is designed to be easy to pack and unpack using common OpenPGP tools, both programmatically and manually.

- Both the To and From headers **MUST** be the address of the user account.
- The Autocrypt Setup Message **MUST** contain an `Autocrypt-Setup-Message: v1` header.
- The Autocrypt Setup Message **MUST** have a `multipart/mixed` structure, and it **MUST** have as first part a human-readable description about the purpose of the message (e.g. `text/plain` or `text/html` or `multipart/alternative`).
- The second mime part of the message **MUST** have Content-Type `application/autocrypt-setup`, and **SHOULD** have Content-Disposition of `attachment`. Its content consists of the user’s ASCII-armored secret key, encrypted within an ASCII-armored OpenPGP symmetrically-encrypted message. Specifically, this means a block delimited with `-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----` and `-----END PGP MESSAGE-----`, which contains two OpenPGP packets: a **Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key**<sup>16</sup> followed by a **Symmetrically Encrypted Integrity Protected Data Packet**<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-5.3>

<sup>17</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-5.13>

- There MAY be text above or below the ASCII-armored encrypted data in the second MIME part, which MUST be ignored while processing. This allows implementations to optionally add another human-readable explanation.
- The encrypted payload MUST begin with an ASCII-armored **RFC 4880 Transferable Secret Key**<sup>18</sup>. All trailing data after the first ASCII-armor ending delimiter MUST be stripped before processing the secret key. The ASCII-armored secret key SHOULD have an `Autocrypt-Prefer-Encrypt` header that contains the current `accounts[addr].prefer_encrypt` setting.
- The symmetric encryption algorithm used MUST be AES-128. The passphrase MUST be the Setup Code (see below), used with **OpenPGP's salted+iterated S2K algorithm**<sup>19</sup>.

#### 4.4.2 Setup Code

The Setup Code MUST be generated by the implementation itself using a **Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG)**<sup>20</sup>, and presented directly to the user for safekeeping. It MUST NOT be included in the cleartext of the Autocrypt Setup Message, or otherwise transmitted over e-mail.

An Autocrypt Level 1 MUA MUST generate a Setup Code as UTF-8 string of 36 numeric characters, divided into nine blocks of four, separated by dashes. The dashes are part of the secret code and there are no spaces. This format holds about 119 bits of entropy. It is designed to be unambiguous, pronounceable, script-independent (Chinese, Cyrillic etc.), easily input on a mobile device and split into blocks that are easily kept in short term memory. For instance:

```
9503-1923-2307-
1980-7833-0983-
1998-7562-1111
```

An Autocrypt Setup Message that uses this structure for its Setup Code SHOULD include a `Passphrase-Format` header with value `numeric9x4` in the ASCII-armored data. This allows providing a specialized input form during decryption, with greatly improved usability.

As a further measure to improve usability, it is RECOMMENDED to reveal the first two digits of the first block in a `Passphrase-Begin` header, sacrificing about 7 bits of entropy. Those digits can be pre-filled during decryption, which reassures the user that they have the correct code before typing the full 36 digits. It also helps mitigate a possible type of phishing attack that asks the user to input their Setup Code.

The headers might look like this:

```
Passphrase-Format: numeric9x4
Passphrase-Begin: 95
```

If those digits are included in the headers, they may also be used in the descriptive text that is part of the Setup Message, to distinguish different messages.

#### 4.4.3 Setup Message Creation

An Autocrypt MUA MUST NOT create an Autocrypt Setup Message without explicit user interaction. When the user takes this action for a specific account, the MUA:

- Generates a Setup Code.
- Optionally, displays the Setup Code to the user, prompts the user to write it down, and then hides it and asks the user to re-enter it before continuing. This minor annoyance is a recommended defense against worse annoyance: it ensures that the code was actually written down and the Autocrypt Setup Message is not rendered useless.

<sup>18</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.2>

<sup>19</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-3.7.1.3>

<sup>20</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically\\_secure\\_pseudorandom\\_number\\_generator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically_secure_pseudorandom_number_generator)

- Produces an ASCII-armored, minimized **OpenPGP Transferable Secret Key**<sup>21</sup> out of the key associated with that account.
- Symmetrically encrypts the OpenPGP transferable secret key using the Setup Code as the passphrase.
- Composes a new self-addressed e-mail message that contains the payload as a MIME part with the appropriate Content-Type and other headers.
- Sends the generated e-mail message to its own account.
- Suggests to the user to either back up the message or to import it from another Autocrypt-capable MUA.

A Level 1 MUA **MUST** be able to create an Autocrypt Setup Message, to preserve users' ability to recover from disaster, and to choose to use a different Autocrypt-capable MUA in the future.

#### 4.4.4 Setup Message Import

An Autocrypt-capable MUA **SHOULD** support the ability to find and import an Autocrypt Setup Message when the user has not yet configured Autocrypt (that is, when `accounts[addr].secret_key` is unset). An MUA in this state could look for such a message in several ways, including:

- If the user decides to enable Autocrypt for an account, and indicates to the MUA that an older MUA has already enabled Autocrypt on that account, the new MUA could ask the user to generate an Autocrypt Setup Message from the old MUA, and then wait (e.g., via **IMAP IDLE**<sup>22</sup>) for such a message to arrive.
- The MUA could proactively scan the account's mailbox for a message that matches these characteristics, and it could alert the user if it discovers one.

When looking for an Autocrypt Setup Message, the MUA may encounter messages that look similar to what it expects, but are not well-formed. If the MUA discovers an e-mail message that has the `Autocrypt-Setup-Message` header but its value is not `v1`, the MUA **SHOULD** ignore this message entirely.

When looking for an Autocrypt Setup Message, if the MUA discovers a message with the `Autocrypt-Setup-Message: v1` header with `To:` and `From:` headers matching an account controlled by the MUA, but the message's metadata and structure is not as expected, the MUA **SHOULD** alert the user that a malformed Setup Message has been found, and it **SHOULD NOT** offer to import the message.

If the MUA finds a good Autocrypt Setup Message, it should offer to import it to enable Autocrypt. If the user agrees to do so:

- The MUA prompts the user for their corresponding Setup Code. If there is a `Passphrase-Format` header in the outer OpenPGP armor and its value is `numeric9x4`, then the MUA **MAY** present a specialized input dialog assisting the user to enter a code in the format described above. If there is no `Passphrase-Format` header, or the value is unknown, then the MUA **MUST** provide a plain UTF-8 string text entry.
- The MUA should try decrypting the message with the supplied Setup Code. The Code serves both for decryption as well as authenticating the message. Extra care needs to be taken with some PGP implementations that the Setup Code is actually used for decryption. For example, [this is difficult to do correctly with GnuPG](#)<sup>23</sup>.
- If it decrypts, then the MUA **SHOULD** update `accounts[addr]` according to the contents of the decrypted message, as discussed in *Accounts controlled by the MUA* (page 4).

See *Example Setup Message* (page 19).

Since Level 1 only recommends looking for a Setup Message when `accounts[addr].secret_key` is unset, some Level 1 MUAs might not look for or handle Setup Messages for an already-configured account at all. If two such MUAs share an account, and both MUAs have somehow enabled Autocrypt on it independently without discovery of a Setup Message, they will have different secret keys. This situation is bad because it may lead to intermittently unreadable mail on either or both MUAs.

<sup>21</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.2>

<sup>22</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2177.html>

<sup>23</sup> <https://dev.gnupg.org/T3277>

These simple implementations can both keep Autocrypt enabled and avoid new unreadable mail if the user manually synchronizes secret keys. To do this, the user must first *destroy their local secret key* (page 16) on one MUA. Afterwards, that MUA can begin looking for a Setup Message again. A more sophisticated implementation may offer a more user-friendly way to detect this situation and resolve it.

## 5 User Interface

Ideally, Autocrypt users see very little UI. However, some UI is inevitable if we want users to be able to interoperate with existing, non-Autocrypt users.

### 5.1 Message Composition

If an MUA is willing to compose encrypted mail, it SHOULD include some UI mechanism at message composition time for the user to choose between encrypted message or cleartext. This may be as simple as a single checkbox.

If the Autocrypt recommendation is `disable` for a given message, the MUA MAY choose to avoid exposing this UI during message composition at all.

If the Autocrypt recommendation is either `available` or `encrypt`, the MUA SHOULD expose this UI with the *recommended default* (page 7) during message composition to allow the user to make a different decision.

If the Autocrypt recommendation is `discourage`, then the MUA SHOULD expose the UI in an inactive state. But if the user chooses to activate it (e.g., clicking on the checkbox), then the UI should display a warning to the user and ask them to confirm the choice to encrypt.

### 5.2 Account Preferences

Level 1 MUAs SHOULD allow the user to disable Autocrypt completely for each account they control (that is, to set `accounts[addr].enabled` to `false`). For level 1, we expect most MUAs to have Autocrypt disabled by default. See *Disabling Autocrypt* (page 16) for more details.

### 5.3 Helping Users get Started

This section provides recommendations for MUA implementations to help users start Autocrypt immediately after an account (with the address `addr`) was set up.

The MUA SHOULD scan the mailbox for messages sent by the user (wherever the messages might be) that show evidence of OpenPGP or Autocrypt usage. It is likely sufficient to only scan the messages sent during the last 30 days, as it is unlikely that the user used Autocrypt or OpenPGP actively if no such message was sent in the recent past.

From the set of all found sent messages, the MUA should determine the best action to take from the following list of choices. Earlier choices are better than later ones.

1. If an Autocrypt Setup Message was found:

Start a setup process suggesting the user to import the setup message. If multiple Autocrypt Setup Messages are found, the most recent message should be preferred.

2. If a sent message with an Autocrypt header was found:

Provide guidance for creating an Autocrypt Setup Message on the MUA that created the message.

3. If there is evidence of actively used OpenPGP software (for example if a secret key is available, some specific software is installed, etc.) or if encrypted mails are found:

Inform the user about Autocrypt on <https://autocrypt.org/pgp-users>.

4. If no evidence for Autocrypt was found:

Create a key with default settings and without a password in the background. Set your `accounts[addr].prefer_encrypt` to `nopreference` and start sending Autocrypt headers.

## 5.4 Disabling Autocrypt

Once Autocrypt is enabled for a given account (`accounts[addr].enabled` is set to `true`), the user might choose to disable it. By default, disabling should only set `accounts[addr].enabled` to `false`, and it **SHOULD NOT** destroy `accounts[addr].secret_key`. This preserves the user’s ability to read old encrypted e-mails, as well as being able to read encrypted e-mails that arrive after the user has disabled Autocrypt.

The act of re-enabling Autocrypt after it was disabled **SHOULD** leave `accounts[addr].secret_key` and `accounts[addr].public_key` intact, so that the user continues using the same key.

## 5.5 Destroying Secret Key Material

When disabling Autocrypt for an account, a Level 1 MUA **MAY** offer the user an opportunity to also destroy the secret key material for that account. Since Autocrypt clients generally do not discuss secret keys with users, a MUA offering this choice should use a phrase like “destroy access to encrypted messages”, rather than referring to “keys” or “key material”.

A MUA that allows the user this opportunity **SHOULD** clearly indicate to the user that the destruction of this secret key material will leave them unable to read any new messages that arrive encrypted. A MUA that only retains the encrypted form of archived messages **SHOULD** also indicate to the user that previously-received encrypted messages will become unreadable as well. Note that for some users, this is a desirable feature: “destroy all messages” is an appropriate action to take in some circumstances.

If the user selects this option, the MUA **MUST** clear both `accounts[addr].secret_key` and `accounts[addr].public_key`.

# 6 Appendix

## 6.1 E-mail Address Canonicalization

To keep consistent state referring to different but practically equivalent writings of an e-mail address, a MUA **SHOULD** canonicalize e-mail addresses when comparing them (for example for using an e-mail address as an index key).

Canonicalizing the domain part (the part after the @): A MUA **SHOULD** canonicalize the domain part using **IDNA2008 Punycode conversion to ASCII**<sup>24</sup>.

Canonicalizing the local part (the part before the @): Autocrypt-capable MUAs that encounter a peer’s e-mail address where the local part appears to be valid UTF-8 **SHOULD** canonicalize the local part by making it all lower-case using the “empty” locale (see **W3C’s discussion on Case folding**<sup>25</sup> for more details).

**SMTP specifications**<sup>26</sup> say the local part is technically domain-specific, and byte-for-byte arbitrarily sensitive. In practice, nearly every e-mail domain treats the local part of the address as a case-insensitive string. That is, while it is permitted by the standards, `John@example.org` is very unlikely to deliver to a different mailbox than `john@example.org`.

An Autocrypt-capable MUA that is configured to use an account that has an e-mail address whose local part is not a valid UTF-8 string, or who cannot receive mail at the canonicalized form of their associated address **SHOULD NOT** enable Autocrypt on that e-mail account without an additional warning to the user.

Other canonicalization efforts are considered for later specification versions.

<sup>24</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5891.html#section-4.4>

<sup>25</sup> [https://www.w3.org/International/wiki/Case\\_folding](https://www.w3.org/International/wiki/Case_folding)

<sup>26</sup> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321.html#section-2.3.11>



## 6.2 Example Autocrypt headers

Alice sends Bob a simple, unencrypted e-mail message that lets Bob write back encrypted if Bob is using an Autocrypt-enabled MUA:

```
Delivered-To: <bob@autocrypt.example>
From: Alice <alice@autocrypt.example>
To: Bob <bob@autocrypt.example>
Subject: an Autocrypt header example using Ed25519+Cv25519 key
Autocrypt: addr=alice@autocrypt.example; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata=
mDMEXEcE6RYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdArjWwk3FAgyiFbFBKT4TzXcVBqPTB3gmz1C/Ub7O1u120F2F
saWN1QGF1dG9jcnlwdC5leGFtcGxliJYEEeYIAD4WIQTrhbtfozpl14V6UTmPyMVUMT0fjjgUCXE
cE6QIbAwUJA8JnAAULCQgHAgYVCgkICwIEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRDyMVUMT0fjjkqLAP9frlijw
BJvA+HFncQZcYIVxlyXzS5Gi5gMTpp37K73jgD/VbKYhkWk9iu689OYH4K7q7LbmdeaJ+RX88Y/
ad9hZwy4OARcRwTpEgorBgEEAZdVAQUBAQdAQv8GIa2rSTzgqbXCpDDYMiKRvitCsy203x3sE9+
eviIDAQgHiHgEGBYIACAWIQTrhbtfozpl14V6UTmPyMVUMT0fjjgUCXEcE6QIbDAKCRDyMVUMT0
fjjlnQAQDFHUs6TIcxrNTtEzFjUFm1M0PJ1Dng/cDW4xN80fsn0QEA22Kr7VkcJjeAEC08VSTeV+
QFsmz55/lntWkwYWhmvOgE=
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 12:56:25 +0100
Message-ID: <abe640bb-018d-4f9d-b4d8-1636d6164e22@autocrypt.example>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

This is an example e-mail with Autocrypt header and Ed25519+Cv25519 key (key
fingerprint: ) as defined in Level 1 revision 1.1.
```

## 6.3 Example Autocrypt Gossip headers

After having received messages with Autocrypt headers from both Bob and Carol, Alice sends an e-mail to the two of them, with Autocrypt Gossip headers.

```
Delivered-To: <bob@autocrypt.example>
From: Alice <alice@autocrypt.example>
To: Bob <bob@autocrypt.example>, Carol <carol@autocrypt.example>
Subject: an Autocrypt Gossip header example
Autocrypt: addr=alice@autocrypt.example; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata=
mDMEXEcE6RYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdArjWwk3FAgyiFbFBKT4TzXcVBqPTB3gmz1C/Ub7O1u120F2F
saWN1QGF1dG9jcnlwdC5leGFtcGxliJYEEeYIAD4WIQTrhbtfozpl14V6UTmPyMVUMT0fjjgUCXE
cE6QIbAwUJA8JnAAULCQgHAgYVCgkICwIEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRDyMVUMT0fjjkqLAP9frlijw
BJvA+HFncQZcYIVxlyXzS5Gi5gMTpp37K73jgD/VbKYhkWk9iu689OYH4K7q7LbmdeaJ+RX88Y/
ad9hZwy4OARcRwTpEgorBgEEAZdVAQUBAQdAQv8GIa2rSTzgqbXCpDDYMiKRvitCsy203x3sE9+
eviIDAQgHiHgEGBYIACAWIQTrhbtfozpl14V6UTmPyMVUMT0fjjgUCXEcE6QIbDAKCRDyMVUMT0
fjjlnQAQDFHUs6TIcxrNTtEzFjUFm1M0PJ1Dng/cDW4xN80fsn0QEA22Kr7VkcJjeAEC08VSTeV+
QFsmz55/lntWkwYWhmvOgE=
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 12:56:29 +0100
Message-ID: <3eal894a-a1cb-4e75-968c-7c1140117e3d@autocrypt.example>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
  protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
  boundary="PLdq3hBodDceBdiavo4rbQeh0u8JfdUHL"

--PLdq3hBodDceBdiavo4rbQeh0u8JfdUHL
Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
Content-Description: PGP/MIME version identification

Version: 1

--PLdq3hBodDceBdiavo4rbQeh0u8JfdUHL
Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="encrypted.asc"
Content-Description: OpenPGP encrypted message
```

(continues on next page)

```

Content-Disposition: inline; filename="encrypted.asc"

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
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=6BDT
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

--PLdq3hBodDceBdiavo4rbQeh0u8JfdUHL--

```

Since Alice encrypts messages to herself, the above message can be decrypted by her private key as well (see the [Example Setup Message](#) (page 19) for access to her private key)

When decrypted, the encrypted part contains:

```

Autocrypt-Gossip: addr=bob@autocrypt.example; keydata=
mDMEXEcE6RYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAPPy13Q7Y8w2VPRkksrijrn9o8u59ralc2CJiHFpbM2G0FWJ
vYkBhdXRvY3J5cHQZlXhbbXBsZYiWBBMwCAA+FiEE8FQeqC0xAKoa3zse4w5v3UWQH4IFAlxHBO
kCGwMFCQPCZwAFcwkIBwIGFQoJCAcCBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQ4w5v3UWQH4IfwAEA3lujohz3N
j9afUnaGUXN7YboIzQsmgGkN8thyb/sLIBAKwdJyg1SurKqHnxy3Wl/DBzOrR12/pN7nScn0+x
4sgBuDgEXEcE6RIKkYBBAgXVQEFAQEhQJSU7QErtJOYXsIagw2qwnVbt31ooVex8Xcb476NCbF
jAwEIB4h4BBgWCAAgFiEE8FQeqC0xAKoa3zse4w5v3UWQH4IFAlxHBOkCGwACgkQ4w5v3UWQH4
LlHQEA1wUBfUU8ORC0RAS/dz1ZSEm7+ImY12Wv8QGUCx5zPbUA/3YH84ZOAQDbmV/C+R//0WVNB
Gfav9X5KYmiratYR7oL
Autocrypt-Gossip: addr=carol@autocrypt.example; keydata=
mDMEXEcE6RYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAKiHXLyIgyS0xGLa+vS+BLtUDydKd3A1E9DpSozOBdfa0F2N
hcm9sQGf1dG9jcnlwdC5leGFtcGxlIjYEEeYIAD4WIQSt8CGd+u2e0+MFQA8EcmYYsmQnEgUCXE
cE6QIbAwUJA8JnAAULCQgHAgYVCgkICwIEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKRAEcmYYsmQnEnQFAQDZjvUBE
80VZkocXiATJ9pU2pPg77ygrcJbiIuHEXcmmgEARhI+IzZWmOFQH6QVGsLYQf981GMGDCoV8MyN
hBHCQq64OARcRwTpEgorBgEEAZdVAQUBAQDAHx6p0V/ki//8CqLoh0EwwqTKyFeHGy4b2c2YFV+
jF3YDAQgHiHgEGBYIACAWIQSt8CGd+u2e0+MFQA8EcmYYsmQnEgUCXEcE6QIbDAAKRAEcmYYsm
QnEtI2AQDc+PCbtyj9BfNttxSD3JMTXlbHDDxuZ84+nXfEVuivQD9H15eunlZnm76voE9rgjPw

```

(continued from previous page)

```
6h3ReWkUrgbT7fX4YsHdws=
Content-Type: text/plain

Hi Bob and Carol,

I wanted to introduce the two of you to each other.

I hope you are both doing well! You can now both "reply all" here,
and the thread will remain encrypted.

Regards,
Alice
```

## 6.4 Example Copy when a Reply can't be Encrypted

The message this is a reply to was sent encrypted, but this reply is unencrypted because I don't yet know how to encrypt to ``bob@example.com``. If ``bob@example.com`` would reply here, my future messages in this thread will be encrypted.

## 6.5 Example User Interaction for Setup Message Creation

The Setup Code shown in this example can be used with *Example Setup Message* (page 19) below.

You'll need to use this Setup Code in your other e-mail app to use the Autocrypt Setup Message:

```
1742-0185-6197-
1303-7016-8412-
3581-4441-0597
```

## 6.6 Example User Interaction for Setup Message Receipt

To initiate the import of the Autocrypt Setup Message, the MUA can display a message like the example below:

ExampleMail has detected an Autocrypt Setup Message created by one of the other apps you use to access "alice@autocrypt.example". By importing the settings from this message, you can start using Autocrypt here in ExampleMail too!

Please enter the Setup Code displayed by your other e-mail app to proceed:

```
17__ - ____ - ____ -
____ - ____ - ____ -
____ - ____ - ____ -
```

[ Cancel ] [ Import Settings ]

## 6.7 Example Setup Message

Alice's MUA sends her a Setup Message after showing her a Setup Code (the code used here is the one from *Example User Interaction for Setup Message Creation* (page 19)). The generated message looks like this:

To: alice@autocrypt.example  
From: alice@autocrypt.example  
Autocrypt-Setup-Message: v1  
Subject: Autocrypt Setup Message  
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 12:56:29 +0100  
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Y6fyGi9SoGeH8WwRaEdC6bbBcYOedDzrQ"

--Y6fyGi9SoGeH8WwRaEdC6bbBcYOedDzrQ  
Content-Type: text/plain

This message contains all information to transfer your Autocrypt settings along with your secret key securely from your original device.

To set up your new device for Autocrypt, please follow the instructions that should be presented by your new device.

You can keep this message and use it as a backup for your secret key. If you want to do this, you should write down the Setup Code and store it securely.

--Y6fyGi9SoGeH8WwRaEdC6bbBcYOedDzrQ  
Content-Type: application/autocrypt-setup  
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="autocrypt-setup-message.html"

<html><body>

<p>

This is the Autocrypt setup file used to transfer settings and keys between clients. You can decrypt it using the Setup Code presented on your old device, and then import the contained key into your keyring.

</p>

<pre>

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

Passphrase-Format: numeric9x4

Passphrase-Begin: 17

```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```

=pulM

-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

</pre></body></html>

--Y6fyGi9SoGeH8WwRaEdC6bbBcYOedDzrQ--

When decrypted with the Setup Code, the encrypted blob at the end contains:

```
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
Autocrypt-Prefer-Encrypt: mutual
```

(continues on next page)

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```
lFgEXEcE6RYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAr jWwk3FAqyiFbFBKT4TzXcVBqPTB3gmz1C/U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=BdSF
-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
```

## 6.8 Document History

This document is kept under [revision control](#)<sup>27</sup>. For detailed history, please consult the git logs. This section provides a high-level overview of what changed between revisions.

### version 1.1

- change required algorithms and recommendation for key generation to Ed25519+Cv25519

### version 1.0.1

- added Terminology section
- added Document History section
- specify how to deal with using non-Autocrypt keys (stripping excess user IDs)
- minor language, markup, and orthography cleanup

### version 1.0.0

- first complete specification

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<sup>27</sup> <https://github.com/autocrypt/autocrypt>